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 Abstract  
Helping to sustain a viable rural sector, rural tourism enjoys public support in many 
countries. We claim that due to club-good and agglomeration externalities in the rural 
accommodation market, public support should be integrated in a broader local development 
policy that regulates the number of accommodation units in a locality. To demonstrate this we 
extended an equilibrium model that accounts for product differentiation and oligopolistic 
competition to address club-good and agglomeration effects and applied it to data collected 
in north Israel. We show that under the prevailing regulation, the number of units is by far 
higher than the social optimum.  
 
1. Introduction  
The decline of agriculture as an income and employment generator in rural areas in 
developed economies has led their populations to search for other more economically 
viable alternatives. Researchers and decision makers often consider rural tourism as 
an appropriate alternative, as it is perceived as a tool for raising the level of economic 
welfare of the local as well as the national economy. Accordingly, rural tourism is 
supported by different policy instruments (Jenkins et al., 1998; Fleischer and 
Felsenstein, 2000). In some cases, rural tourism is promoted without regulation, 
resulting in farmers diversifying to rural tourism as long as they consider it profitable. 
We contend that due to externalities in the rural tourism industry supporting it without 
appropriate regulation could lead to its overdevelopment. In fact, when the number of 
rural accommodations units in a locality starts exceeding the socially optimal one, 
public support might lead to opposite consequences than had been intended.  
The rural tourism industry is uniquely characterized by club good elements on the 
demand side and industrial agglomeration effects on the technology side. Visitors 
enjoy the private good of rural accommodations and the club good of rural ambience 
and landscape. However, as the number of accommodations units and guests in the village increases, congestion sets in and utility starts to decline (Buchanan, 1965). An 
unbalanced development of accommodation units can result in congestion, noise, and 
environmental pollution thereby causing disutility to the visitors up to the point that it 
can threatens the very same rural amenities that attracted them in the first place. Other 
possible negative externalities occur when an excessive number of rural households 
enters the rural tourism industry while abandoning their agricultural activity. In such a 
case the agricultural landscape, along with its positive impact, (Fleischer and Tsur, 
2000) might gradually vanish. Moreover, in this special case an increase in the 
number of rural accommodation operators not only leads to club good effect as more 
visitors share the club good but also leads to a decline in the size of the club good. 
This is because more tourism operators mean less rural environment and landscape 
and more built tourism structures.   
On the supply side, an increase in the number of rural tourism operators at a given 
locality can lead to agglomeration economies (Rosenthal and Strange, 2004)   
including shared infrastructure (scale economies), pulled labor and other inputs as 
well as information externalities. For example, infrastructure such as promenades, 
signposts, parking lots, information booths, and lighting systems can be considered a 
fixed costs shared by all the operators. As these costs are being shared among an 
increasing number of firms, the per-firm costs decrease. Furthermore, potential 
entrants to the rural tourism industry may enjoy information from the incumbents 
firms about existing demand, visitors' preferences and feasibility of production. 
The EU as well as many individual EU countries have recognized the existence of 
externalities in the rural tourism market and the importance of sustainable 
development, and thus attempt to regulate and support it (see Tchetchik, 2006). In 
Israel too, support measures are accompanied by some level of regulation; the government directly limits the supply of rural accommodations by prohibiting the 
establishment of rural accommodations in certain regions and by restricting the 
number of rural accommodations per firm (the limit is determined individually for 
each village). However, a major problem arises when implementing such regulations: 
Since there is no explicit limit on the number of accommodations units per village, 
this limit is actually determined by the number of households that enter the rural 
accommodation market and the limit set on the number of accommodation units per 
firm (which is usually set to meet different planning and national considerations). As 
a result, welfare considerations regarding the rural accommodations market are not 
taken into account. At present, there is a high concentration of firms in many villages; 
in fact, as many as 35 percent of the inhabitants are engaged in tourism and this figure 
is expected to grow even further (Tchetchik et al., 2008).  We claim that without an 
appropriate government intervention in the rural accommodations market, the number 
of units in each village may ultimately exceeds the socially optimal one. 
The aim of this study is to identify the socially optimal number of rural 
accommodation in a village by extending the model in Tchetchik el al. (2008) and 
applying it to the Upper Galilee region. The model developed is an equilibrium model 
of demand and pricing equations for each rural accommodation firm. The model 
addresses the effects of club good on consumers' preferences for rural 
accommodations and agglomeration at the technology side of the rural 
accommodations firm. Other than a regional competition, this model also integrates 
price competition within rural accommodation firms in the same village and its 
possible interplay with agglomeration and club good forces.  By deriving the 
empirical model and applying it to our data set, we estimate the model’s parameters 
and conduct simulations of the market equilibrium under different market regimes and policies. We show that an increase in the number of accommodation units per village, 
although within the regulated limit, can eventually lead to a decrease in the market’s 
total welfare. The contribution of this paper is two folds; conceptually, it addresses for 
the first time club good and agglomeration externalities in the tourism industry under 
a structural economic model. Empirically, the paper provides econometrically robust 
mechanism for analyzing and identifying optimal spatial density of accommodations 
units in the rural areas. 
The paper proceeds as follows: next section provides the theoretical model. The 
derived empirical model, data source and the estimation procedure are described in 
the third section.  The results of the estimated model are discussed in section four. 
Section five presents several simulations of possible policies scenarios. The last 
section concludes.  
 
2. The Model 
We model equilibrium in rural accommodations market at the regional level, 
following Tchetchik et al. (2008). We specify is a discrete-choice equilibrium model 
with product differentiation in which a nested-logit framework is used to describe 
consumer preferences. The different villages in the region naturally form the different 
nests. The regional market is modeled as a differentiated-product, oligopolistic 
market, with N single product firms. The model is set in a “characteristic space” 
(Lancaster, 1971, McFadden, 1978) and allows for both vertical and horizontal 
differentiations. Consumers’ utility depends on the chosen product's characteristics, 
on random idiosyncratic preferences, and on a small set of parameters to be 
estimated. Market demand is then determined by aggregating a discrete-choice model of consumer behavior. Prices are endogenous and determined through competition 
among the firms.  
The primitives of the model are the variety of brands offered by the firms, which is 
fixed in the short-run
1, consumer preferences over these products, and the equilibrium 
notion (Nash equilibrium). While all market decisions are assumed to be observed by 
all market participants, the econometrician observes only market outcomes (the firms' 
prices and market shares). Finally, the model allows that both the econometrician and 
the consumers do not observe all product characteristics (following Berry, 1994). 
Demand 
Consider a regional rural accommodations industry with N lodging firms, dispersed in 
V distinct villages and serving M potential consumers. The utility of consumer 
from staying at accommodation firm { M i ,..., 1 ∈ } { } N j ,..., 1 ∈  is denoted Uij and 
depends on the attributes of the private good, i.e., the accommodation unit including 
its price, and on the attributes of the club good, i.e., the rural landscape and ambience. 
The club good effect is captured in the density variables  and  , a second degree 
polynomial. The density variable can be measured by the number of accommodation 
units per village or per village local population. The utility function receives the 
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1 Treating product characteristics as exogenous is commonly done in most empirical studies of 
differentiated products. In the context of accommodations facilities this is not a strong assumption 
since in the short run product characteristics are given. 
 where  is a vector of observed product characteristics of the j
th firm, pj is the price 
per unit night α, σ,   and 
j x
' ,μ μ β  are the model’s parameters; and ςj, ξiv, and εij 
represent utility components which are attached by the consumer to the unobservable 
characteristics of the unit. In particular,  j ζ  is a firm-specific component which is 
common to all consumers, and ξiv represents the i
th tourist's preference for a specific 
village  . Finally, εij represents the i
th tourist's preferences for a specific 
firm. 
{ V ,..., 1 } v∈
An individual i prefers alternative j
* over all other k alternatives if 
. This inequality sets the basis for the derivation of the 
various firms’ market shares. For this end a few more assumptions about the 
population distribution of the idiosyncratic utility components, attached by the 
consumers to the unobserved characteristics,
j k N k u u ik ij ≠ ∈ ∀ ≥ }, ,.., 1 { *
ij ir ε σ ζ ) 1 ( − + , are required. In particular, 
the latter term is assumed to be an i.i.d variable with a population mean of zero. In 
addition, assuming that ε is an extreme value variable implies that  ij ir ε σ ζ ) 1 ( − + is 
also an extreme value random variable (Cardell, 1997).   
With these assumptions, a closed-form expression for firm j’s market share, Sj, can be 
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where δj is firm's j mean utility level,    j v v j j j d d p x ζ μ μ α β δ + + + − =
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Pricing It is assumed that the single firm chooses its price to maximize short-run profit. In 
other words, for a given (exogenous) firms' attributes the price is chosen to maximize 
profit. At the regional-industry level, we assume that the observed prices reflect a 
Nash equilibrium in a price game. That is, each firm engages in an oligopolistic 
competition and sets its price to maximize profits given the prices of the other firms.  
The necessary condition that characterizes firm j's best response to the pricing of the 
other firms is given by:   
(3)   0
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where  is the variable cost as a function of the accommodation units' 
attributes and the operator's characteristics zj,, the density level of the village,  , and 
annual occupancy (M is the number of potential consumers, sjM=qj is the annual 
quantity of sold nights for firm j). Due to agglomeration economies, we expect c'(.) to 
decrease in . Note that the characteristics that affect cost are not necessarily those 
that affect consumer preferences (z≠x).  
) , , ( N s d z c j v j
v d
v d
Equation (3) sets the basis for the estimation of the pricing behavior and the effects of 
the village and accommodation characteristics on marginal costs.  
Welfare Measurement  

































 This formula is utilized in the simulations below that examine the impact of industry 
agglomeration on consumer surplus. 
 
 3. Estimation Procedure and Data 
The following section describes the empirical specification of the model which 
includes the demand and pricing equations and the estimation procedure. 
3.1 Empirical Specification 
To derive an empirical specification for the demand equation we introduce an outside-
good whose mean utility level is normalized to 0. We let rural accommodations in all 
other regions in the country represent the outside-good
2. Dividing the natural logs of 
the analytical market shares by the outside-good's market share and transforming the 
dependent variable to be expressed in occupancy rates rather than market shares, yield 
the following equation:  
(5)   j v j j v v j
n
j
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where   are firm's j and the outside good occupancy rate respectively,  is 
the village market share of accommodation firm j and β, β
n, α, σ, μ and μ' are 
parameters to be estimated.  Treating 
0 and o o j v j s /
j ζ as an error component, equation (5) can be 
used for the estimation of the model parameters. Rewriting equation (5)  in terms of 
                                                             
2 The assumption that the prices of rural accommodations in all other regions are exogenous is a strong 
one but can be justified based on the findings in Tchetchik et al. (2008) about the importance of the 
geographical region within the consumer choice process. In particular, the Upper Galilee region, on 
which we focus here, was found to demonstrate the highest positive marginal effect on the demand for 







= , where nj is the number of units offered by firm j.  
The variable dv is a measure of the density of accommodation units in the village. The 
size of the plot for each household in the village is more or less the same, thus 
measuring density as the number of accommodation units per village residents 
provides a good approximation to the proportion of land used for tourism purposes.  
Similar to the case of other club goods (Buchanan, 1965) we assume that when a 
certain level of density is passed, the benefit the guests elicit from the rural ambiance 
of the area starts to decrease. Thus, we expect the market share (or occupancy rate) as 
a function of density to form an inverse U shape. Accordingly we include both dv and 
dv
2 in the demand equation.  Finally, the variable ln(nj) is added to the right-hand side 
of equation (5) as a result of the transformation of the dependent variable from a 
market share to an occupancy rate.  
In order to derive an estimable pricing equation we assume that the marginal cost is 
constant in the output level, linear in the accommodation units' characteristics, and 
has logarithmic relation with the industry density in the village. Incorporating these 







 from the demand theoretical 
equation yields:  
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where  γ j w  is the marginal cost and   represents the agglomeration 
economies (accordingly  is expected to be negative), the term on the right-hand side 
) ln( v
d d γ
d γof equation (6) represents the oligopolistic price-cost markup. The error term, ω j 
represents the marginal costs associated with the unobserved characteristics of the 
accommodation unit and the operator's unobserved managerial skills.  
3.2 Estimation Procedure and Instruments 
Equations (5) and (6) were estimated as a system of equations using the general 
method of moments (GMM) which was found to be the most econometrically suitable 
(for a more detailed discussion see Tchetchik et al, 2008). To carry out the procedure 
we utilize the NLOGIT3 (LIMDEP) NLSUR procedure. This procedure requires 
instruments for the price and market shares. We chose two groups of instruments, the 
first one for the market share includes the attributes of the accommodation unit that do 
not affect cost such as the number of other- accommodation units, luxury elements, 
log-cabins and tourists' attractions in the village and the surveyor impression of the 
unit. These variables are correlated with the firm's market share but are independent 
of the unit's unobserved characteristics. The second group for the price includes the 
characteristics of competing rural accommodation units in the village such as area of 
cultivated land, and village type (specifically, whether the village is a nonagricultural 
community). These instruments are cost-shifters that do not appear in the demand 
equation and other exogenous variables that are not included in the model, but are 
found to be correlated with price.  
3.3 Data  
The rural accommodations industry has exhibited an average annual growth rate of 
15% over the last 20 years. It currently consists of 12,000 accommodation units 
scattered in about 250 rural communities including semi-cooperatives (moshavin), collectives (kibbuzim), and private villages. The villages are located in five distinct 
geographical regions. About half of which are located in the Upper Galilee region.  
We extract from Tchetchik's (2006) data those observations that refer to the Upper 
Galilee region only (for details on the data collecting procedure see Tchetchik, 2006).  
Out of a total sample of 200 observations, those of the Upper Galilee sum up to 107 
observations (24% of the regional population of units) and are dispersed over six 
villages. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of these rural accommodations and 
includes the variables and instruments employed in the regression analysis. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Regression Variables and Instruments 
Variable Description  Mean S.D. 
Firm’s total market 
share 





Total nights divided by the region's market 
size  
0.93% 0.84%
Within village share  Equals firm’s share within the village  5.61% 5.87%
Occupancy rate  Annual average occupancy rate  0.28 0.12 
Price  Average price per unit night in NIS   296.4 77.4 
Breakfast*  =1 if breakfast is included in the hospitality 
price 
0.34    
Luxury (a)  Value of luxury elements based on their cost  4.95 4.15 
Amenities  # of amenities, e.g. bath-oils, homemade jam, 
fruits 
2.7 2.19 
Number of units  # of  accommodations units per firm  4.07 2.66 
Unit size  Average size of each firm’s units in m
2   33.73 12.52 
Business age  # of years the firm operates in the market  7. 71  6.26 
Village Density (b)  Village number of accommodation per 1000 
residents  
104.95 56.04 
Owners Agriculture*  =1 if the owner's agric. land is on sight from 
the units  
0.45    Rosh-Pina*  =1 if the firm is located in Rosh-Pinahvillage   0.22    
Active  Farm*  =1 if the operator is also an active farm 
operator 
0.58    
Cultivated land  Total cultivated land in dunam (0.1 Hectare)  8.20 2.5 
Instruments 
Surveyor rating   The surveyor impression from the 




=1 if the firm is located at a nonagricultural 
community 
0.18  
Cultivated Land  Total area of cultivated land in dunam (0.1 
hectare) for active farmers 
9.45  
OTHBRKST  Number of other rural accommodations 
operators in the village who serve breakfast 
12.6 8.4 
OTHLUXSE(a)    Other luxury features in the village   97.95 38.8 
OTHLCSET    Other log-cabin shares in the village   4.52 3.53 
OTHARTRS      Other attractions in the village operated by 
rural accommodations operators 
13.5 8.6 
OTHAMENST    Other amenities offered in the village   53.8 17.2 
Notes: One asterisk indicates a dummy variable (a) Each point represents NIS 1000 of 
investment in luxury elements per unit (b) number of residents in each village was adjusted to 
fit sample size.    
 
4. Econometric Estimates  
4.1 Demand estimates 
Table 2 reports the GMM estimation results of the demand equation coefficients, 
marginal effects and partial elasticities. With the exception of the dummy variable for 
an active farm, all the coefficients estimated in the demand equation are significant 
and have the expected sign.  The view of the farmland landscape, luxury elements, 
special amenities, unit size, and breakfast serving all have a positive sign, meaning 
that they contribute to an increase in the market share. Units in the village of Rosh-
Pinah enjoy an extra benefit from the unique setting of its quaint little houses, art 
galleries and specialty restaurants. Being an active farm does not have any significant 
impact on demand.  
 Table 2: GMM Estimates for the Demand Equation 





 b  Elasticities
 c 
Constant -1.086* 0.19    
Owner Agriculture 
view 0.18* 0.05 49.17*    0.21*
Luxury elements  0.024* 0.01 6.43 * 0.31*
Rosh-Pina 1.34* 0.14
ln(No. of units)  0.43* 0.09 28.2   0.27*
Village Density     0.026* 0.0049
Village Density sq.     -0.0001034* 0.000020
1.23* 1.19*
Active farm  -0.01 0.03  
Special amenities  0.05* 0.01 13.8*   0.36*
Breakfast included  0.03** 0.03 8.25   0.03
Unit size  0.05** 0.02 12.33*   0.40*
Price (NIS per night)
a -0.0026* 0.0005 -0.71* -2.03*
σ
 a  0.64* 0.05   
*,** Significant at 5% and 10% respectively 
(a) These variables are shared with the pricing equation in Table 4. 
(b) Calculated by using bootstrapping  
(c) Elasticities were calculated only for continuous variables at the mean value. 
 
The demand elasticity is elastic and equals -2.03. This high level of elasticity 
indicates that despite the differentiation among the units there is still a high level of 
substitution between them. The “nested-logit” parameter σ=0.64 is statistically 
significant indicating a strong within village dependency between the stochastic parts 
of the utility. The significance of σ provides a justification to the employment of the 
nested-logit to describe the demand of the rural accommodation market at the regional 
level. 
Finally and most importantly we assess the existence of a club good effect in the 
consumer preferences for rural accommodations and to quantify it. Both coefficients 
for density and density squared are significant and demonstrate an inverse U shaped 
relation between the firms' average occupancy rate and the density of rural 
accommodations units in the village. These relations are depicted graphically in 
Figure 1. Figure 1: Average Occupancy Rate as a Function of Accommodations Units' 
Density at the Village  
 
   Number of accommodations unit per 1,000 residents 
 
A possible explanation for these relations is that at the earlier stage of development 
when the number of accommodation units in a village is low, visitors might enjoy the 
feeling and ambience of a rural village when they see a few other tourists. However, 
as the density of the units grows the quiet rural environment disappears and the 
average occupancy rate starts to decline. The average optimal density level of 
accommodation units within a village is calculated to be 124 units for each 1000 
residents. At this level of units the average occupancy rate per firm is the highest. 
This result can be translated from the aggregate market level to the individual level as 
the highest probability to choose the firms in the village with the optimal density (all 
other things being equal). 
 
4.2 Pricing Equation  
Table 3 reports the estimation results and elasticities of the pricing equation. The 
variables Luxury and Special Amenities are found to have a positive and significant contribution to the cost. The negative and significant coefficient of the variable 
Village Density confirms the existence of agglomeration economies in the production 
of rural accommodations services. Elasticity is found to be -0.13 which indicates that 
an increase of 1% in the village density lowers costs by 0.13 percent. These relations 
are depicted graphically in Figure 2. 
Table 3: GMM Estimates for the Pricing Equation 
Variable   Coefficients   
 
Standard 
Errors   P[|Z|>z]  
Marginal 
Effects 
a  Elasticities 
b 
Constant 246.50*  64.69  0.01     
Special amenities  14.72*  2.51  0.00    0.13 
Breakfast included  -3.39  8.60  0.71     
Luxury elements*  8.03*  1.12  0.00    0.13 
Unit size  5.87  5.12  0.32     
Farm's cultivated area  -0.92  1.69  0.65     
Number of years since 
establishment of firm  1.61  0.78  0.26     
Number of units  -0.17  1.69  0.92     
Village Density (ln)     -38.61*  8.35  0.00  -0.34  -0.13 
 
* Significant at 5% 
(a) Calculated by using bootstrapping.  
(b) Elasticities were calculated only for continuous variables at the mean value.  
 
Based on the estimated coefficients, the average markup margin among the 107 
sampled firms was calculated to be 57%. These results indicate that the rural 
accommodations market in the Upper Galilee significantly deviates from a 









4.3 Goodness of Fit 
Since our estimation procedure is based on instrumental variables, the usual R
2 
statistics is inappropriate, neither as a selection criterion nor as a measure of goodness 
of fit (Pesaran and Smith, 1994). In order to assess the goodness of fit we compare the 
predicted versus the actual distributions of the dependent variables. Predicted values 
for the estimated system were obtained by designing a computer program. In 
particular, Gauss non-linear simultaneous-equations subroutine was employed. 
Solving demand and pricing equations for each of the firms in the market yields 
equilibrium predicted outputs and hence equilibrium prices can be immediately 
calculated. This program was used to conduct the simulations in the next section. The 
calculated goodness of fit figures for the demand and pricing equations are 0.63 and 
0.36 respectively, demonstrating a good fit of the model to the data. 
 5. Simulations 
Using the estimated parameters we were able to simulate different equilibrium 
scenarios in the Upper Galilee rural accommodations market. In the first scenario, we 
evaluated the effectiveness of the existing regulation. We increased the number of 
units for each operating firm up to the limit set by the existing regulation, assuming 
no new firms would enter the market. As mentioned previously, the limit for the 
maximum number of units differs between villages thus we increase the number of 
units for each firm according to its village limit. Many of the firms are operating 
below the regulation thus for them the number of units increases in the simulation. 
The simulation results in Table 5 show that although the number of units increases, 
the market share for some of the villages decreases while in other villages it increases 
(original and simulated density levels appear in Table 4). Specifically, in two out of 
the three villages where the original densities are above 124 (Amirim and Bet-Hillel), 
market shares have decreased while in the third village (Shar-Yeshuv) market-share 
increased by 5%. Note that for high density villages, as the number of accommodation 
units increases, two opposite forces come to action. On the one hand, the increase in 
the number of units lowers the production cost and thus the price which leads to an 
increase in the market share. On the other hand, the increased density lowers the 
guests’ utility from the accommodation which leads to a decrease in the market share. 
Market shares in the other three villages (Korazim, Metula, and Rosh Pinah) increase 
since their original densities were lower than 124 and are still so in the simulation. 
Table 4: Present and Simulated Density Levels 
Village Density 
Present 
Density Simulation   
Shar-Yeshuv   186  192 Amirim   136  191 
Bet-Hillel   165  302 
Korazim   33  52 
Metula   77  95 
Rosh-Pinah 30  39 
 
Table 5: Simulation 1- Increase in Number of Units Up to the Limit Sets by 
Regulation for Presently Operating Firms  
  Actual Change  Percentage Change 
Village Market Share    
Shar-Yeshuv   0.6%  5% 
Amirim   -3.4%  -21% 
Bet-Hillel   -17.3%  -94% 
Korazim   3.3%  80% 
Metula   4.8%  23% 
Rosh-Pinah 12.1%  44% 
Other Indicators    
consumer welfare (NIS)  13  3% 
Average firm profits (NIS)  -2,424  -3% 
Aggregate firms’ profits (000' NIS)   -259.3  -3% 
Total welfare (000' NIS)    -297.3  -1% 
Average price (NIS)  -2.0  -1% 
Average markup   -0.3%  -0.7% 
Size of the market (000' rooms nights)  -1.6  -3% 
Average occupancy rate  -11.5%  -28% 
 
The simulation results with a decrease in average price, mark-up and firm's profit. 
Whereas average consumer surplus increases by 3%, total market size decreases by 
3% and as a result total welfare decreases by 1%. Namely, if all the incumbent firms 
exhaust their village regulated limit some villages will benefit while other will incur 
losses and total welfare will only marginally shrink. However, it should be noted that 
in this simulation we assumed that no new firms will enter. In a simulation where 
each household in a village enters the market with an existing average number of units, the welfare level suffers a decline of 50 percent. These results show that at the 
present situation the club good effect in the demand overpowers the agglomeration 
effect in the supply. When number of units surpasses the optimum level the market is 
facing a drop in its welfare level.  
The second simulation is comprised of six simulations for six different density levels 
below and above the optimal density level of 124. The simulation results are 
presented in Table 6 and the changes in the welfare levels are shown graphically in 
Figure 3.  
Table 6:  Percent Change in Market Share and Other Market Indicators in Six 
Simulations According to Density Level 
  Density level – Number of Units per 1000 residents 
  110 115 124 130 140 145 












Shar-Yeshuv  -3  -42 -42 -18  -6  1 
Amirim  4  -55 -55 -48 -48 -46 
Bet-Hillel -21  -49 -51 -51 -52 -54 
Korazim  -88 90 93 96 97 94 
Metula  18 -39 -41 -29 -26 -26 
Rosh-Pina 13  102  105  80  73  70 
Other Indicators        
Consumer  welfare  30 39 40 36 35 34 
Average  firm  profits  -41 -43 -42 -39 -43 -44 
Aggregate firm profits  -7  -31  8  18  20  21 
Total  welfare  18.9 37.5 43.5 45.7 45.9 45.8 
Average  price  -0.7  -0.7  -2 -2 -3 -3 
Average markup  -0.2  -3  -0.1  2  3  3 
Market  size  -4  7  11 13 14 15 
Average  occupancy  rate  -52 -32 -32 -46 -51 -54 
 Figure 3: Simulated Welfare Level as a Function of Density  
 
 
We can see that at an average density level of 140 the welfare level reaches a 
maximum. Moreover, the difference in the slope up to the optimum level and after it 
is due to the different impacts of the agglomeration and club good effects. Up to 124 
units both forces act in the same direction, increase in the number of units lowers the 
costs of the operators and increases consumer utility. Between 124 and 140 although 
both forces act in opposite directions total welfare still increases, however at a higher 
density level, consumer disutility from its' negative externalities take over and cause 
the drop in the market share and hence total welfare. Since agglomeration economies 
are still pushing for an increase in the market share, the slope is not as sharp as up to 
the optimum. These results confirm the finding of the first simulation that the 
demand's club good effect of an increase in the density level overpowers the 
technological agglomeration effect. If all households in the villages will enter the 
market with their regulated number of units, the density level will varies between 600 to 900 which is far from the optimum level of 140. This means that the current 
regulation is based on considerations which are irrelevant to the welfare level of the 
rural accommodations market.   
6. Summary and Conclusions 
We utilized a regional market equilibrium model in the rural accommodations 
industry to analyze externalities and their impacts on the market. The model 
comprises of demand and pricing equations that accounts for product differentiation 
and oligopolistic competition, and more importantly, for agglomeration externalities 
and club good effects. The model was estimated using data on rural accommodations 
the Upper Galilee region in Israel. The results obtained suggest that both club good 
and agglomeration effects exist in this regional market. Specifically, an inverse U-
shaped relationship was found between consumer's preferences for rural 
accommodations and the level of accommodations units' density in the village. This 
implies that an optimum level of rural accommodations development at the village 
level exists. On the technology side, evidence was found for technological 
agglomeration economies.   
The importance of regulation in the regional accommodation market is presented in 
the simulations showing that public support in rural tourism has to be integrated into a 
broader locality-level development planning, and should be accompanied by specific 
means of regulation otherwise it may achieve inefficient result. With the existing 
regulation and the support policy, the regional rural accommodations market in the 
Upper Galilee can reach overdevelopment and face loss of welfare. The number of 
firms has been constantly increasing since the survey was conducted, in fact, the 
market has doubled itself, and signs for an overdevelopment might have been seen in 2009 where many operators reported losses (TheMarker, Israel, 9/2009). This 
evidence coincides with Tchetchik et al. (2008) prediction that the number of units 
can be doubled before a significant price decrease would occur.   
The model employed in this study introduces for the first time a structural economic 
framework that addresses club good and agglomeration effects, as well as product 
differentiation and oligopolistic competition. Application of this framework to the 
rural tourism industry, which is subject to these distinctive market failures, provides 
important policy implications. This framework can be easily applied to tourism and 
rural tourism markets in other economies and help in designing long-term policies.  
Our study is concerned with the impact of overdevelopment of rural accommodation 
units on the market welfare. However, this is only one facet of the overall picture. 
Another group whose welfare may be affected by an overcrowded village is the local 
community that is not involved in the tourism activity but lives in the village. Further 
research dealing with the carrying capacity of tourism destination to avoid negative 
externalities felt by the host community is warranted.  
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